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Post-Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium Theory 
Roger E. A. Farmer*ψ 
 
Abstract 
This paper explains the connection between ideas developed in my recent books and 
papers and those of economists who self-identify as Post-Keynesians. My own work is 
both neoclassical and ‘old Keynesian’. Much of my published work assumes that 
people have rational expectations and that ‘animal spirits’ should be modeled as a new 
fundamental. I adopt a general equilibrium framework to model the macroeconomy. 
But although I write from a neo-classical tradition the themes I explore in my published 
writing have much in common with heterodox economics. This paper explains the 
common elements between these seemingly disparate traditions. I make the case for 
unity between Post-Keynesian and General Equilibrium Theory under the banner of 
Post-Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Theory.   
Keywords: Post-Keynesian Economics, DSGE Theory, Rational Expectations 
JEL classifications: B22, B40, E12, E13, E32 
I.Introduction 
In writing The General Theory (Keynes, 1936), Keynes changed the course of history. What were 
the most important ideas in that book and how should we incorporate them into modern 
approaches to macroeconomics? 
One response that can, and has, been offered is: Who cares what a dead economist had to say? 
We have moved on. In the proceedings of a conference of heterodox macroeconomists, 
presenting that answer would no doubt be perceived as unsatisfactory.  In contrast to some of 
my fellow neoclassical and New-Keynesian economists, I believe we have a great deal to learn 
from the history of thought. But my answer to the question: what can we learn from Keynes? is 
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different from both mainstream approaches to Keynes’ ideas, and to the views of many 
heterodox economists.   
I have consistently argued that Keynes made three important points  (Farmer R. E., 2008; 
2010a; 2010b; 2012a), (2013). First, the views of participants in the stock market are an 
independent fundamental force that influences, not just the financial markets, but also the real 
economy. Second, the labor market is not an auction and the unemployment rate can 
potentially end up in many possible ‘equilibrium’ states. And third, government has an 
obligation to do something about this. 
Before I am hit with eggs from a torrent of Minsky supporters let me say that I am using the 
word equilibrium here in the sense of a one period temporary equilibrium that may, or may 
not, be moving over time.1 
I hope that I have said very little that will be controversial to this audience. Where I suspect I 
differ, is that I see a real benefit in a research agenda that reconciles these ideas with Walrasian 
general equilibrium theory (Walras, 1899). And once one accepts that that is a valid enterprise, 
the best framework with which to reconcile Keynes with Walras, is Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium theory. I make the case here for a Post-Keynesian DSGE approach to 
macroeconomics.  
Now, let me be clear, I do not think that the atemporal, Walrasian fiction of complete financial 
markets is the right approach. There clearly was no grand market meeting at the beginning of 
time in which we all traded date-, location- and state- specific commodities into the infinite 
future. A more reasonable starting point, in my view, is the temporary equilibrium framework 
constructed by Hicks in Value and Capital (Hicks, 1939).  
In Hicks’ framework, market participants come together in a weekly market meeting to trade 
commodities. The current week is linked to past weeks through stocks of capital goods and 
financial assets that the participants bring to market: And it is linked to future weeks by the 
expectations of market participants about future state-contingent prices and future production 
opportunities.  
If one agrees to follow this paradigm, one must ask how goods are allocated in each weekly 
meeting. The Walrasian answer is that prices are adjusted by a fictional auctioneer who ensures 
that, conditional on the state of expectations, the quantities demanded and supplied of every 
good are equal. Hicks’ answer, developed after reading a draft of the General Theory, was that 
some prices are slow to adjust, and, as a consequence, there may be demand spillovers from 
one market to another.2 This is the Patinkin-Clower-Leijonhufvud (PCL) interpretation of The 
General Theory (Patinkin, 1956), (Clower, 1967), (Leijonhufvud, 1966). 
                                                        
1 I refer here to Hyman Minsky (Minsky, 2008) who argued that the economy is never in equilibrium in the sense in 
which that term is used in the natural sciences; as the rest point of a dynamical system. 
2 See (De Vroey, 2006), who discusses the evolution of Hick’s ideas. 
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The PCL view was taken up and further developed by Benassy and Malinvaud in France and by 
Barro and Grossman in the United States and, even though markets do not clear in the 
Walrasian sense, their interpretation of how to construct macroeconomic theory is very much a 
DSGE approach in the sense in which orthodox macroeconomists use that term (Benassy, 1975) 
, (Malinvaud, 1977), (Barro & Grossman, 1971). My point is that the DSGE approach is a very 
broad church that includes models which a purely Walrasian theorist might refer to as 
disequilibrium. Equilibrium, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder.  
II.Who is a Post-Keynesian? 
I believe that intellectuals are, or should be, inclusive in their acceptance of alternative 
approaches to interesting questions and I am not going to propose a Keynesian version of the 
Nicene Creed. If you self-identify as Post-Keynesian; that’s good enough for me. I do think, 
however, that we can draw an interesting analogy with evolutionary biology. In his wonderful 
book, The Beak of the Finch, Jonathan Weiner (Weiner, 1995) describes evolution in action on 
the Galapagos Islands.  
In response to a prolonged period of drought, Weiner describes how the characteristics of the 
birds that inhabit different parts of the island begin to diverge. If drought conditions persist, the 
finches on one part of the island stop breeding with those on another and, slowly, separate 
species begin to emerge. When eventually, the rains return with the arrival of El Niño, inter-
breeding recommences and the divergent characteristics of the emergent populations are 
merged, once more, into a single species.   
When did Post-Keynesians stop interbreeding with their orthodox cousins? It was in 1955. That 
was the year when Paul Samuelson introduced the neo-classical synthesis into the third edition 
of his influential introductory textbook.3 According to the neo-classical synthesis, the economy 
is Keynesian in the short-run, when prices and wages are ‘sticky’, and classical in the long-run 
when they have time to converge to their Walrasian levels. Participants at this conference do 
not need me to point out that this idea has very little to do with Keynes.  
The intellectual descendent of the neo-classical synthesis is New-Keynesian economics, an 
approach that is neither new nor Keynesian and that has more in common with Hume’s essay, 
Of Money, (Hume, 1777), than with The General Theory. New-Keynesian economics was 
constructed on the core of a representative agent real business cycle model by a group of 
neoclassical economists, notably Michael Woodford in his Magnus opus Interest and Prices 
(Woodford, 2003). It is built onto the real business cycle framework by adding costs of changing 
                                                        
3 See Kerry Pearce and Kevin Hoover (Pearce & Hoover, 1995) for a discussion of the evolution of the ideas 
contained in Samuelson’s textbook, Introductory Economics. The neo-classical synthesis first appeared in the third 
edition (Samuelson, 1955). I discuss the history of the development of New-Keynesian economics, and its roots in 
Samuelson’s interpretation of Keynes, in my book, How the Economy Works, (Farmer R. E., 2010b).  
Roger Farmer                                                                                                                         January 2017  
 
 
4 
prices and the resulting theoretical construction makes Frankenstein’s monster look like a 
beauty queen.4 
But although the New-Keynesian reconciliation of Keynes with Walras is ugly, we should not 
infer that all possible reconciliations of Keynes with Walras will be similarly unattractive. New-
Keynesian economics is built on two assumptions. The first is that aggregate quantities can be 
modeled ‘as if’ they were chosen by a single optimizing household with superhuman 
perceptions of future prices. The second is that an ‘evil agent’ throws sand into the adjustment 
process and prevents prices from quickly moving to equate the demands and supplies of all 
commodities.  
I will argue here, that we can make considerable progress in our task of understanding the 
macroeconomy by relaxing each of these assumptions. I will take these two assumptions in 
turn.  First, I will demonstrate that, by dropping the representative agent assumption, we may 
construct models with multiple equilibria that can be Pareto ranked. Second, I will explain a 
concept I call Keynesian search theory to provide a reconciliation of Keynes’ concept of 
involuntary unemployment with Walrasian equilibrium theory that is different and more 
elegant than the sticky price explanation of New-Keynesian economics.  
III.Dropping the Representative Agent Assumption 
Rational Expectations and Animal Spirits Can Coexist 
The representative household assumption is convenient because the mathematics of a model, 
populated by a representative household, is relatively simple. A single household facing a 
decision problem will always choose a unique action. But a household interacting with other 
households, most of whom have not yet been born, is a very different matter. Even if the 
physical world were unchanging, we would still face uncertainty as to the ways that our 
descendants will behave in the future. A model, populated by overlapping generations of 
finitely lived people, always has multiple equilibria.5  
I will repeat that statement because it is so important and so misunderstood. A model, 
populated by overlapping generations of finitely lived people, always has multiple equilibria. 
                                                        
4 Anyone who has ever tried to teach the New-Keynesian Phillips curve will grasp my meaning. The student is first 
introduced to the ‘Calvo fairy’, a mythical creature who randomly decides which firms, in any period, are allowed 
to contemplate changing prices. Next, one must assume that, in an inflationary environment, firms do not pick a 
price, they pick a mechanistic rule for adjusting their price on a weekly basis. The pricing rule must be aggregated 
over identical monopolistically competitive firms and the resulting equation must be linearized around a 
hypothetical stationary growth path. See my book, Prosperity for All (Farmer R. E., 2016) for a discussion of the 
connection between the ugly and unrealistic assumptions that under-pin the New-Keynesian model and the 
concentric circles used by Ptolemacian astronomers to justify their assumption that the Earth is at the center of 
the solar system.  I first discussed the relationship between Ptolemacian astronomy and New-Keynesian economics 
in my paper (Farmer R. E., Animal Spirits, Persistent Unemployment and the Belief Function, 2012b).  
5 See my book, The Macroeconomics of Self-Fulfilling Prophecies (Farmer R. E., 1993), for a discussion of the role of 
multiple equilibria in macroeconomics. 
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When we trade with other people in markets, we each make implicit assumptions about what 
we think will happen in the future. Our expectations of what will happen influence the way we 
behave. For much of the history of economics, that fact was taken as a given and economists 
built theories in which expectations, aka beliefs, were thought of as independent driving 
variables. But in 1972, all that changed. Robert Lucas wrote a paper (Lucas Jr., Expectations and 
the Neutrality of Money, 1972) in which he claimed that our beliefs about what will happen 
cannot independently influence what actually does happen.  
Lucas’s argument went something like this. Economists have dealt with uncertainty by tacking 
random variables onto otherwise deterministic models. That approach is inconsistent with the 
concept of rational behavior because the people who populate our models would surely come 
to recognize that the world is random.  
Imagine a household decision maker who wanted to forecast some future price, 𝑃. Before 
Lucas, the economic theorist would hypothesize that the decision maker forms an expectation 
of 𝑃; call this expectation 𝑃".  And because 𝑃 and 𝑃"  are distinct variables, the theorist would 
need to add an equation to determine 𝑃". This equation often took the form of a so-called 
adaptive expectations equation.   
Lucas argued that we should think of 𝑃 as a function of some underlying state of nature that we 
could denote by 𝑆. Think of 𝑆 as a die, cast by the gods. Economists refer to 𝑆	as fundamentals. 
The important assumption in Lucas’ theory is the idea that every time nature throws a six, the 
price 𝑃, takes the same value, 𝑃(6). More generally, we could denote the observed price with 
the notation 𝑃(𝑆), meaning that 𝑃 is a function of 𝑆.	Importantly, if 𝑆 is always associated with 𝑃(𝑆) then it would be foolish to assume anything other than that 𝑃"(𝑆) = 𝑃(𝑆). In words, we 
do not need a separate equation to determine expectations. Drawing on a previous paper by 
John Muth (Muth, 1961), Lucas called this idea rational expectations (Lucas Jr., 1972). 
In The General Theory (Keynes, 1936), expectations are drive by animal spirits which represent 
an independent driving force of business cycles.  When Lucas introduced the concept of rational 
expectations into macroeconomics, he thought that he had banished the idea of animal spirits 
from macroeconomics. He was wrong.  
Like a good magician who diverts your attention while withdrawing a card from his sleeve, 
Lucas slipped an assumption into his argument that almost nobody noticed. He assumed that 
there is a unique mapping from 𝑆 to 𝑃. While that may be true in the world of the 
representative household; it is never true in the world of overlapping generations.6 The 
implication of that fact is that we cannot dispense with an equation that selects the 
                                                        
6 In a paper first released in 1984, (Farmer & Woodford, 1997) Michael Woodford and I pointed out that the model 
used by Lucas to introduce rational expectations (Lucas Jr., 1972), contains an infinite dimensional continuum of 
equilibria. In my 1990 paper (Farmer R. E., 1990), I showed that the existence of multiple equilibria  invalidates the 
universality of Lucas’s celebrated critique of econometric modeling (Lucas Jr., 1976). In the first edition of my book, 
The Macroeconomics of Self-fulfilling Prophecies, (Farmer R. E., 1993), I proposed to resolve the indeterminacy of 
equilibria by introducing a new fundamental that I call a belief function.   
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equilibrium. We must write down an equation that specifies how people think about the future; 
something similar to the adaptive expectations assumption. The dirty little secret here is that, 
when there are multiple equilibrium outcomes rational expectations and animal spirits can 
coexist. 
Equilibrium, Efficiency and the Great Lakes of North America 
I think it would be fair to say that Post-Keynesians are not big fans of general equilibrium 
theory. Their antagonism to the equilibrium approach stems, I believe, not from the concept of 
equilibrium, but from the concept of efficiency. Under some very special circumstances, 
economic theorists have shown that every economic equilibrium is efficient in a well-defined 
sense: There is no intervention by a government agency that can improve the welfare of one 
person without making someone else worse off. That proposition goes by the imposing name of 
the first welfare theorem of economics and the efficiency concept, named after Vilfredo Pareto, 
(Pareto, 1906) is called Pareto Efficiency.  
Let me stress something that is often overlooked, at least by macroeconomists. The first 
welfare theorem is just that, a theorem. There is a breed of macroeconomist whose natural 
habitat is the environs of the Great Lakes of North America, that views the first welfare 
theorem as a tautology. While the very best economists from the Great Lakes region are well 
aware of the qualifying conditions that are required for efficiency, that level of self-awareness is 
often lacking in their epigones. 
The validity of the first welfare theorem rests on a set of assumptions about the structure of 
the economy. If these assumptions are a good characterization of the real world, we may infer 
that real world markets do a good job of allocating resources. If they are a poor 
characterization of the real world, the first welfare theorem is nothing but a beautiful 
mathematical abstraction.  
If the assumptions of the first welfare theorem do not hold in the real world, we may still 
construct models in which aggregate quantities are modeled as markets in equilibrium; but we 
will not be entitled to infer that the allocations that arise from these markets are, in any way, 
optimal. To drive this point home; we might model an economy with twenty five percent 
unemployment as ‘in equilibrium’ without being forced to conclude that there is no possible 
government intervention that could improve peoples’ lives. Although some equilibria may be 
Pareto Optimal, we need not conclude that all of them are. 
This will not be surprising to most economists as economic theory has accepted the possibility 
of multiple equilibria, some of which may be Pareto inefficient, for a very long time.7 That was 
the main focus of my 1993 book, The Macroeconomics of Self-fulfilling Prophecies (Farmer R. E., 
1993) and it is a theme that was well understood when I was an assistant professor at the 
                                                        
7 A leading example that many will be familiar with is the concept of the prisoner’s dilemma in game theory. It is 
rational for a prisoner to confess to a crime if he cannot guarantee that his partner will remain silent.   
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University of Pennsylvania in the 1980s.8 But the obsession of macroeconomists with the 
representative household assumption has blinded them to the possibility that equilibrium 
outcomes may be very far from optimal. Let me expand on that idea, by relating it to a popular 
idea in the finance literature; the concept of efficient markets.  
Post-Keynesians, New Keynesians and the Grim Reaper 
The efficient markets hypothesis is a term coined by Eugene Fama to denote the idea that it is 
difficult or impossible to make money through trades in the financial markets unless you know 
something that somebody else does not know.  Fama refers to that idea as informational 
efficiency and there is a large finance literature which argues, persuasively, that markets are 
efficient in this sense (Fama, 1970). It is unfortunate that Fama used the term efficiency to 
describe this concept because it has nothing to do with the way that economists typically use 
that term. A market that is informationally efficient is not necessarily Pareto efficient.  
What does this mean and why is it important? Let us conduct an imagined dialogue between a 
North American economist from the Great Lakes region, I will call her Janet, and a Post-
Keynesian graduate student who has read my book, Prosperity for All (Farmer R. E., 2016). I will 
call him Brad.  
Janet:   The distinction between informational efficiency and Pareto efficiency is a distraction. 
If people trading in the financial markets cannot make money, nor can the 
government. There is no such thing as a free lunch.  
Brad: I disagree. The fact that a market is in equilibrium does not mean that it is efficient. 
Janet: Well OK, I know that you Post-Keynesian types are willing to make all sorts of 
assumptions about market frictions. Those assumptions don’t seem credible to me. As 
a first approximation, I am willing to assume that prices are perfectly flexible. 
Brad: You seem to be confusing me with a New-Keynesian. I’m happy with the flexible price 
assumption.  I’ll give you that one. 
Janet: Well perhaps you think that there are missing financial markets. I know that Kenneth 
Arrow has argued that transactions costs preclude the existence of all the financial 
instruments necessary to generate market efficiency (Arrow, 1964). But I don’t buy 
that. If there are big potential gains from trade, there are big incentives for private 
agents to create new markets. Just look at all the derivatives that were created over 
the last few decades. They came about because of lower transactions costs. I’m willing 
to assume, to a first approximation, that there is a complete set of financial markets. 
                                                        
8 For a discussion of the evolution of the research agenda on endogenous business cycles, sunspots and multiple 
equilibria, see my survey paper, The Evolution of Endogenous Business Cycles (Farmer R. E., 2014). 
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Brad: While that seems like a stretch; I’ll give you that one too. Let’s assume that there is a 
complete set of financial markets and that everyone participating in the financial 
markets can make any conceivable trade in the futures markets at zero cost. 
Janet: Is it the assumption of perfect knowledge you’re uncomfortable with? I know that 
Frank Knight (Knight, 1933) drew a distinction between risk and uncertainty and that 
you Post-Keynesian types keep harping on about radical uncertainty. Although you 
may have a point there, I just don’t see how we can make any progress if we assume 
that nobody knows anything about the future. I’m willing to go with the assumption 
that we live in a stationary world because it’s the best chance we have of saying 
something about the behavior of short-run macroeconomic variables. And that means 
that we should also assume that people have rational expectations. 
Brad: Well I’m not entirely on board with that. But, for the sake of argument, let’s agree to 
model the way that human beings would act if they did live in a world where all 
uncertainty is generated by a known stationary probability distribution and where the 
people in our model have rational expectations. If we can agree on the answer to what 
an equilibrium would look like in that world, then perhaps we can extend our 
equilibrium concept to a more complicated world where the future is characterized by 
radical uncertainty. 
Janet: Hmmm… If you accept all of these assumptions, I’m having trouble understanding why 
you don’t understand that, if private agents can’t make money in markets, then 
neither can the government. Maybe you’re one of those Marxist types who thinks that 
product markets are characterized by monopolists and we need unions to defend 
workers’ rights. In my view, that’s a load of poppycock. Product markets are 
contestable and, to the extent they’re not, the solution is limited regulation. I don’t 
see what that has to do with the distinction between informational efficiency and 
Pareto efficiency.  
Brad: Wow: you really have drunk the Kool-Aid. But no; that’s not my point either. Let’s 
suppose you’re right that the labor market and the product markets are well 
approximated by the assumption of perfect competition. I’m willing to give you flexible 
prices, complete markets, rational expectations, and perfect competition. But there’s 
one little fact you can’t get around. 
Janet: What’s that Brad? 
Brad: The Grim Reaper. People die and new people are born. Even if everyone present today 
could make trades with each other contingent on every conceivable future event, the 
unborn cannot participate in markets that open before they are born. Government, on 
the other hand, is present in every period and it can intervene on behalf of our 
children and our grandchildren. 
Janet: Nonsense. We don’t need government for that; we need the family. Robert Barro 
showed that all we need to correct the inefficiency in an overlapping generations 
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model is for parents to love their children. The representative household is a useful 
fiction because each of us is connected by a chain of operative bequests.9  
Brad: You’re wrong Janet. Overlapping generations models have not one, but two kinds of 
inefficiencies. Robert Barro’s argument applies to dynamic inefficiency, which is the 
fact that, in overlapping generations models, interest rates can be too low. There is a 
second kind of inefficiency that was pointed out by David Cass and Karl Shell (Cass & 
Shell, 1983). And Costas Azariadis (Azariadis, 1981) showed that overlapping 
generations models can lead to volatile fluctuations in asset markets that have nothing 
to do with fundamentals. In his book, Prosperity for All (Farmer R. E., 2016), Farmer 
argues that a large fraction of the fluctuations we see in stock markets are caused by 
this second kind of inefficiency. And this second kind of inefficiency cannot be 
eliminated by the family because it would require that our parents leave positive 
bequests in some states of nature and negative bequests in other states of nature. 
My imagined conversation between Janet and Brad is meant to illustrate the idea that we can 
accept the tenets of temporary equilibrium theory while rejecting the first welfare theorem. 
The conversation focuses on why government might have an advantage over private markets 
and it focuses on one specific market failure; the inability of human beings to participate in 
insurance markets that open before they are born. 
In my published academic books and papers, I accept the obviously false assumption that 
uncertainty is well characterized by a known time invariant probability distribution. I am happy 
to make this assumption because I want to distinguish features of the real world that arise 
because nature rolls a loaded and time varying die, from features of the real world that arise 
from the way human beings react to this fact. 
Imagine a human being whose sole purpose in life is to play a repeated game against nature. 
Each time the game is repeated, the probability of any given outcome is the same. In that 
environment, it is reasonable to suppose that eventually the human being would learn the 
probability of any particular move by nature. For example, the probability of snow in 
Minneapolis in December is close to 1. Given that fact, the human being playing the game will 
choose to purchase warm clothing. 
Contrast that situation with a human being who plays a game against other human beings. Each 
time the game is repeated, some of the players are replaced by new ones. Suppose further, 
that every player seeks to achieve a well-defined goal and assumes correctly, that every other 
player has the same objective. An equilibrium, in game theory, is a strategy for each player that 
cannot be improved upon, given the strategies played by the other players. I contend that we 
can understand a great deal about real world economies by modeling them as a repeated game 
between a changing set of players and it is a fact that many games of this kind have more than 
one equilibrium. A temporary equilibrium, in the sense of Hicks, is a special case of such a game 
                                                        
9 Barro’s work on this topic is contained in his paper, ‘Are Government Bonds Net Wealth? (Barro, 1974). 
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and my statement that overlapping generations models possess multiple equilibria is a 
recognition of that fact. 
As Hicks conceived it, temporary equilibrium theory does not require that people have rational 
expectations. Post-Keynesians have been vehement critics of the rational expectations 
hypothesis but I am inclined to accept it as a working assumption in order to focus on a more 
important issue; the existence of persistent high unemployment as a possible equilibrium 
outcome. 
While I have considerable sympathy for the notion of radical uncertainty, like Brad in my 
dialogue, I think it is fruitful to ask how a society of interacting human beings would act in a 
world in which all uncertainty was generated by a sequence of known stationary probability 
measures. In other words, let us suspend disbelief and accept the assumption that the future is 
characterized by what Frank Knight called risk as opposed to uncertainty. 
IV.Dropping the Sticky Price Assumption 
Unemployment and Keynesian Search Theory 
That leads me to a more contentious point of disagreement between New-Keynesian and Post-
Keynesian economists: How should we think about unemployment? In the 1970s, conventional 
economists gave up on Keynes and accepted the Lucasian argument for a return to classical 
principles. One reason for this apostasy is that Keynes did not provide a satisfactory answer to 
the question: Why don’t firms offer lower wages to unemployed workers?  
Microeconomists of the post WWII period wanted to understand macroeconomics in terms of 
microeconomic principles and neither Keynes himself, nor the North American Keynesians at 
Harvard, Yale and MIT provided a satisfactory answer.10 Their attempts led to the split between 
Post-Keynesians, who carried the torch of Keynesian purity, and New Keynesians, who provided 
a highly unsatisfactory answer to the unemployment question; unemployment persists because 
wages and prices are sticky. Post-Keynesians have correctly pointed out that Keynes denied 
that his theory was grounded on the assumption of sticky wages and prices.11 But as Don 
Patinkin once said to me; if The General Theory was not about sticky prices, what was it 
about?12 
                                                        
10 Leading North American Keynesians included Alvin Hansen at Harvard, Robert Solow, Paul Samuelson and Franco 
Modigliani at M.I.T. and James Tobin at Yale.  
11 This has also long been a theme of my own interpretations of Keynesian economics. See, for example, my paper 
Sticky Prices (Farmer R. E., 1991). 
12 I was privileged to take a class from Don Patinkin on the history of thought when I was a graduate student at the 
University of Western Ontario. Later, I got to know him well as a colleague when he visited UCLA often to teach for 
one quarter a year. During our conversations he displayed a considerable skepticism for the notion that The 
General Theory is about sticky wages or sticky prices, an irony that was not lost on him since Don’s own work had 
been instrumental in the development of that interpretation of Keynes’ General Theory.  
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I have an answer to that question. The labor market is not an auction in which a fictitious 
character asks buyers and sellers to submit demands and supplies until he has found a set of 
market-clearing prices. It is a search market in which buyers and sellers are randomly matched. 
I am going to borrow a concept from a recent literature that I call classical search theory in 
which we conceive of a matching function that determines the probability of a meeting 
between a buyer and a seller. A neoclassical production function describes the different ways in 
which commodities can be produced from labor and capital. Similarly, a matching function 
describes the ways in which a filled job can be produced from given numbers of searching 
unemployed workers and searching members of the recruiting departments of firms.   
One hundred bushels of corn per week can be harvested by ten people with scythes or by one 
person with a combine harvester. Similarly, one hundred jobs per week can be filled if five 
hundred people search for two hundred vacancies or if two hundred people search for five 
hundred vacancies.  
When prices are set in auction markets, the relative prices of labor and capital send signals to 
farmers that cause them to choose the best combination of labor and capital. Best, does not 
just mean that the farmer makes as much profit as possible. It also means that labor and capital 
are efficiently allocated from a social perspective. This important insight, captured by the first 
welfare theorem of economics, explains why capitalist market economies triumphed over 
soviet social planning. Under some circumstances; markets work well. 
But although capitalist market economies are a great deal better at allocating resources than 
soviet social planning; they are not perfect. Sometimes, markets go very badly wrong. Nobody 
would argue that twenty-five percent unemployment in the United States during the Great 
Depression was evidence of the success of markets. As Modigliani famously quipped, the Great 
Depression was not caused by a sudden attack of contagious laziness (Modigliani, 1977). 
Even if markets worked efficiently, we would not expect unemployment to be driven to zero. 
The labor market is dynamic and people continuously leave old jobs and look for new ones. It 
takes resources to quickly match labor market entrants with the right job. Firms must divert 
people from the activity of producing commodities to the activity of screening new job 
applicants. To reduce the unemployment rate to zero, firms would need to divert so many 
people to the personnel department that production would suffer.   
I will refer to the unemployment rate that maximizes social output of commodities as the 
natural rate of unemployment. A successful theory of Keynesian unemployment must explain 
how equilibrium unemployment can differ from the natural rate of unemployment. New-
Keynesians explain this divergence by invoking the assumption of sticky prices. In contrast, to 
the New-Keynesians, my work demonstrates that unemployment persists because the labor 
market is incomplete. Labor market equilibrium is Pareto inefficient because there are not 
enough relative prices to allocate resources between competing ends.  
In my book, Prosperity for All (Farmer R. E., 2016), I propose a new branch of search theory that 
I call Keynesian search theory. I distinguish it from classical search theory which refers to the 
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work of Peter Diamond, Dale Mortensen and Christopher Pissarides and for which they were 
awarded the Nobel Prize in 2010.13 In classical search theory, the absence of prices to 
determine the allocation of job search between unemployment and vacancies, is replaced by 
the assumption that workers and firms bargain over wages.  
Keynesian search theory departs from classical search theory in a fundamental way. In classical 
search theory the multiplicity of equilibrium is resolved by introducing a new parameter, the 
worker’s bargaining weight. In Keynesian search theory the multiplicity is resolved, instead, by 
assuming that beliefs about the future value of the stock market is a new fundamental. The 
allocation of job search between unemployment and vacancies is pinned down by aggregate 
demand and aggregate demand is, in turn, determined by the animal spirits of participants in 
the asset markets.14 Importantly, there are many possible labor market equilibria and in almost 
all of them, the unemployment rate is different from the one that would be chosen by a social 
planner. 
V.Everything You Need to Know About Macroeconomics 
I have made two arguments in this paper. First, the capital markets are inefficient because not 
all people are able to participate in them. I have shown in my published research that that fact 
implies that the wealth of market participants may move up and down in arbitrary ways driven 
purely by beliefs (Farmer R. E., Expectations, Employment and Prices, 2010a). Animal spirits are 
fundamentals that should be granted the same methodological status as technologies, 
preferences and endowments. 
Second, the labor market is a not an auction; it is a Keynesian search market in which the 
unemployment rate is determined by aggregate demand. That fact leads to an equilibrium 
concept in which any unemployment rate can be an equilibrium (Farmer R. E., Confidence, 
Crashes and Animal Spirits, 2012a).  In contrast to the ideas that were developed by the New 
Keynesians, the equilibria in my models are stationary and can potentially persist forever.  
These two arguments can be related to a diagram that, in times gone by, was taught to every 
student of macroeconomics: The Keynesian Cross, a formulation of the central ideas in The 
General Theory, appeared as a central component of macroeconomic theory as it was taught by 
                                                        
13 In Prosperity for All, I first used the term Keynesian search theory to distinguish my work, where equilibrium 
selection occurs in the asset markets, from the works by Peter Diamond (1982), Dale Mortensen, (1970) and 
Christopher Pissarides (1976) (DMP) where equilibrium selection occurs in the labor. I refer to the DMP model as 
classical search theory. 
14 I first developed these arguments in a paper (Farmer R. E., Old Keynesian Economics, 2008) that was presented 
at a 2006 conference in honor of Axel Leijonhufvud. It is further explored in two papers, (Farmer R. E., Confidence, 
Crashes and Animal Spirits, 2012a) and (Farmer R. E., Animal Spirits, Financial Crises and Persistent 
Unemployment, 2013). The ideas are also presented in three books, (Farmer R. E., Expectations, Employment and 
Prices, 2010a), (Farmer R. E., How the Economy Works: Confidence, Crashes and Self-fulfilling Prophecies, 2010b) 
and (Farmer R. E., Prosperity for All: How to Prevent Financial Crises, 2016). 
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Samuelson in his textbook, Economics: An Introductory Analysis (Samuelson, 1955).   The 
Keynesian Cross plots income on the horizontal axis and expenditure on the vertical axis.  
In Figure 1, I have graphed a version of the Keynesian Cross that is closer in spirit to the General 
Theory than the version developed by Samuelson. In contrast to Samuelson’s version, my 
version plots employment on the horizontal axis and output, measured relative to the money 
wage, on the vertical axis.15  The student who truly understands this diagram is well on the way 
to mastering the most important ideas in macroeconomics. It illustrates the two most 
important concepts in The General Theory, concepts that have formed the basis for everything I 
have drawn attention to in my work. 
The first is the idea of beliefs as an independent driver of business cycles. According to Keynes, 
animal spirits, aka beliefs, is an independent driving variable that shifts the aggregate demand 
curve up and down. As the curve shifts, so its intersection with aggregate supply also shifts. This 
intersection represents an equilibrium, or rest point, of the macroeconomy. An important 
research question for macroeconomics is: what are the determinants of the aggregate demand 
curve and why does it shift around in sometimes unpredictable ways over time? In my view, 
Keynes’ theory of the consumption function is inadequate to answer this question.  We should 
instead explicitly model the connections between consumption and wealth. 
The second is the idea that any unemployment rate can persist as a steady state equilibrium. 
Keynes argued, correctly in my view, that unemployment is often involuntary. But he did not 
provide an adequate explanation of aggregate supply and, notably, he did not explain to the 
satisfaction of his contemporaries how high involuntary unemployment can persist in 
                                                        
15 Following Keynes, I am measuring employment in units of ordinary labor and I am measuring output in wage 
units. I explain this diagram in my published paper Aggregate Demand and Supply (Farmer R. E., Aggregate 
Demand and Supply, 2008). The use of employment and output on the axes reflects the definitions in Chapter 4 of 
The General Theory (Keynes, 1936). In his exposition of Keynesian Economics, Samuelson amended this diagram by 
plotting income on the horizontal axis and expenditure on the vertical axis.  
 
Figure 1: The Keynesian Cross 
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equilibrium. My work on Keynesian search theory provides that explanation. Unemployment 
persists because the labor market is a search market, not an auction market, and there are 
insufficiently many relative prices to coordinate the behaviors of market participants. 
Post-Keynesian finches and their New Keynesian cousins have avoided each other for far too 
long. Just as the arrival of El Niño in the Galapagos Islands allowed diverging species to once 
more merge, it is my hope that the shock of the Great Recession will catalyze interbreeding 
between new-Keynesian and heterodox economists. If I am right, more of my neo-classical 
contemporaries will need to listen to the drum beat that post-Keynesians have been sounding 
for sixty years. And Post-Keynesians will need to explain to neo-classical and new-Keynesian 
economists, in their own language, what they are doing wrong. General equilibrium theory, 
broadly interpreted, like mathematics, is a language. If you are young enough to have not yet 
been corrupted by establishment elites of either subspecies, I urge you to think hard about 
joining me in establishing Post-Keynesian DSGE theory as the future of macroeconomics. 
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